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A Fait Accompli: The Prague Spring, Warsaw Pact Invasion, and the United 
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 The Prague Spring and subsequent Warsaw Pact invasion was a major watershed moment 
of the Cold War. However, the entire ordeal is little more than a footnote in the historiography of 
American involvement in the Cold War. The reaction of the United States was negligible but to 
dismiss it outright ignores an important sequence of events. These events illustrate the 
complicated nature of Cold War diplomacy. 
 Imperative to this research project is the importance of the Prague Spring. The liberal 
reforms of Czechoslovak leader Alexander Dubcek and the crucial geographic position of 
Czechoslovakia made the Prague Spring a potentially lethal threat to Moscow and the Eastern 
Bloc. Negotiations between the Johnson administration and the Soviets concerning strategic arms 
limitations, the earliest stages of SALT talks, put the Johnson administration in a bind. The 
Johnson administration was distracted with SALT talks and missed, or disregarded, the signs that 
the Soviet led Eastern Bloc was preparing to invade Czechoslovakia. The Warsaw Pact invasion 
commenced on August 21, 1968, and armed forces from Poland, Hungary, East Germany, 
Bulgaria, and the Soviet Union quickly crushed the Prague Spring.  
 It is ironic that the crackdown on the Prague Spring caused the collapse of the talks—it 
was the Prague Spring that the Johnson administration had been ignoring in order to pursue an 
arms limitation treaty. Johnson himself admitted that the SALT treaty would have been his 
administration’s greatest success. Those talks were cancelled in response to the Warsaw Pact 
invasion, which was the harshest condemnation the US could muster. The Prague Spring was 
sacrificed for détente, but the lack of further and more public condemnation of the invasion 
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paved the way for SALT negotiations to resume under President Richard Nixon’s administration 
in the following years. 
 At first glance, the response of the United States to the Warsaw Pact invasion is trifling. 
However, this research project has concluded that the Johnson administration could do little in its 
reaction to the invasion. It had been distracted with SALT negotiations and the possibility of an 
arms limitation treaty. Consequently the Johnson administration had to sacrifice both—a quiet 
but meaningful response to the Warsaw Pact invasion.  
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